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nited States hegemony over the 
international system has been the 
norm since President George H.W. 
Bush declared that the U.S. had the 
ability to create a “New World Order” (Bush 
1991).  However, politicians in the United 
States and in Europe have started to question 
the role that the U.S. should take on the world 
stage due to the aggressiveness of the Trump 
Presidency and a subsequent loss of trust in 
U.S. capabilities and motives (Emmott 2019).  
Trump has made some rather dramatic 
changes in his rhetoric regarding NATO.  Due 
to members’ perceived reluctance to pay for 
military upkeep, Trump has taken a more 
belligerent stance against NATO members 
than any former president.  Certainly, burden 
sharing within the alliance has been an issue 
of importance for several presidential 
administrations prior to Donald Trump.  
However, no other president has taken it so far 
as to question and even decline to affirm 
support for Article 5 which dictates mutual 
defense within the alliance (Gray 2017).  
President Trump has railed against NATO’s 
members, specifically those in Europe, for not 
contributing enough to the alliance.  President 
Trump has focused his attacks through the 
lens of percentage of the gross domestic 
product being applied to military and defense 
capabilities.  One should also take note of the 
criticisms levied by past  
administrations as well. President Obama and 
President Bush both noted that they wanted 
their European allies to contribute more to 
NATO defense spending.  Bush pointed out 
that increased spending on European defense 
would strengthen the forces of NATO, while 
Obama took note of decreased defense 
spending among European allies in 2014 
(Collinson 2018).  It would appear as though 
American patience with NATO has somewhat 
dwindled overtime.  This has been a pressing 
issue as indicated by former U.S. secretary of 
defense Robert Gates who declared “NATO’s 
future ‘dim if not dismal’” if it did not seek to 
bolster its forces (Binnendijik 2016).  
President Trump still clearly demonstrates a 
more hostile approach that could shake up the 
alliance. The true question is whether his 
criticisms of European defense spending are 
warranted. 
      Burden sharing within NATO is a far more 
complex topic than just the amount of money 
being spent on troops and technology.  NATO 
is an intricate alliance based on the concept of 
collective action, a concept which aims to 
maximize defensive capabilities in a wartime 
scenario.  The alliance requires that its 
members uphold their militaries to a certain 
budgetary and readiness standard so that all 
U	
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members may benefit from a general increase 
in their military power.  The aim of this paper 
is to answer the question as to whether, and if 
so why, non-U.S. NATO allies are free riding 
in lieu of the charges levied by current and 
former presidential administrations.  This 
paper will seek to determine levels of free 
riding through the lens of three different 
facets: NATO defense expenditures will be 
considered, as well as two burden sharing case 
studies in Libya and Afghanistan.  Free riding 
itself shall be defined in each case by the input 
of relevant monetary, political, and tactical 
contributions.  If evidence demonstrates that 
free riding is apparent, it is also important to 
understand the factors that are encouraging 
countries to engage in such activity.  The 
research will demonstrate that burden sharing 
can be a very complex facet of NATO to 
analyze, even though there are clear cases of 
unequal burden sharing within the alliance.  
Free riding will be made apparent by the 
complexities present in the two case studies.  
Furthermore, this paper will also take into 
consideration the economic theory presented 
regarding burden sharing and how it factors 
into alliance cooperation. 	LITERATURE	REVIEW	
The state of burden sharing within NATO 
has had its fair share of criticisms since the 
alliance’s conception.  Critics have been quick 
to point out that the United States appears to 
bear a heavy share of the defense burden 
while other members appear to free ride and 
take advantage of U.S. military power.  Truly, 
debates surrounding burden sharing itself 
remain contentious within the NATO 
community.  Burden-sharing literature was 
initiated with an article by Mancur Olson and 
Richard Zeckhauser entitled “An Economic 
Theory of Alliances.”  The paper was written 
in 1966, and it aimed at exploring (through 
economic theory) how burden sharing works 
within alliances.  They concluded that other 
countries would attempt to free ride on other 
members within the alliance in order to get the 
max extent of benefits while providing a 
minimal amount of support. This conclusion 
was profound and formulated what became 
known as the “exploitation hypothesis.” They 
came to this conclusion through the 
examination of pure public goods within an 
alliance.  According to Olson and Zeckhauser, 
a pure public good can be described as “non-
rivalrous” and non-excludable.”  A more 
technical understanding of their conclusion is 
as follows: the pure public good of deterrence, 
which is provided by the richest country, 
results in the other alliance members free 
riding on commitments of the richest member.  
This became part of a theory of organizations 
which is known as “collective action”. (Olson 
and Zeckhauser 1966). 
Olson and Zeckhauser’s article on 
collective action was influenced by an earlier 
piece of research written by Mancur Olson 
entitled The Logic of Collective Action: Public 
Goods and the Theory of Groups.  Olson’s 
book explores how groups and organizations 
work in order to further a common goal 
through the utilization of economic theory.  
Olson pointed out examples of how private 
business, unions, and governments interact 
with one another in order to make their sector 
more profitable, receive concessions for 
workers, or secure their nations.  It is clear 
that these examples can also be applied to 
NATO, as Olson pointed out in his 
aforementioned article with Zeckhauser.  The 
relevance of this book is that it sets the basis 
for understanding how public goods can lead 
to free riding in an organization such as 
NATO.  Olson’s conclusion, regarding how 
the members of a group act, was that these 
groups might find themselves to be at odds 
with another member within the group which 
might have the ability to increase security 
output in an alliance like NATO.  He also 
pointed out that for this to work, there must be 
some sort of sanction in place that encourages 
members to pay into the organization.  In 
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NATO, there is no truly effective sanction to 
discourage free riding behaviors (Olson 1971). 
      A great deal of research has been done to 
expand on Olson and Zeckhauser’s work. 					
Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley’s work, for 
example, summarized the various models 
employed in the field.  The initial theory, 
proposed in “An Economic Theory of 
Alliances,” of a pure public good model was 
considered to be too restrictive and did not 
take into account a multitude of other factors 
for which a “joint-product model” would seem 
to make up.  For example, the joint-product 
model includes a high ratio of excludable 
benefits which changes the idea behind 
collective action in an alliance.  These 
findings weakened the “exploitation 
hypothesis” since the equation is no longer 
limited to the pure public good of deterrence.  
The joint-product model still points out other 
ways that countries will attempt to free ride on 
other allies by factoring in those excludable 
benefits.  It is still possible for a deficit to be 
apparent, though not as likely (Hartley 2001). 
      Sandler and Hartley also worked together 
on an earlier piece which attempted to 
reevaluate the factors that go into calculating 
the equity involved in burden sharing.  The 
earlier work contributed to the 2001 paper 
considering that it provided new criterion to 
look at collective action.  They pointed out 
various new factors that could be considered 
viable contributions to the alliance and could 
result in a more equitable share of the burden 
between nations.  In sum, Sandler and Hartley 
pointed out how different measures of burden 
sharing should be applied and to what degree.  
For example, military budgets and a nation’s 
willingness to engage in a conflict are two 
very different measures, but both are equally 
important to understanding whether a country 
is truly shouldering their fair share of the 
burden.  The ultimate conclusion of this paper 
is that nations will tend to pick a specific 
measurement which shows that they are 
shouldering more of the burden than other 
nations while not paying attention to the range 
of other factors involved in contributing to the 
alliance (Hartley 1999). 
      Discussions of free riding within NATO 
on the American side argue that the United 
States is simply being fooled into providing 
defense.  They believe the U.S. should be 
wary of supporting wealthy European nations 
that don’t want to spend as much on their 
militaries.  Alan Tonelson’s early 2000s 
article highlighted this mood as he explored 
how changes in international geo-politics 
appear to be putting the U.S. at greater risk.  
Tonelson conveyed the risk associated with 
NATO through both material and non-material 
causes.  He argued that U.S. actions leave the 
country exposed to more precarious situations.  
Tonelson mentioned that there is a greater risk 
that the U.S. can be dragged into “non-article 
5” conflicts even though America’s original 
objective was to keep the power of Russia in 
check through its military presence.  Tonelson 
pointed to the example that U.S. troops 
stationed in European countries are at risk of 
injury in an attack (particularly from terrorists 
or irregular forces) and could be stuck in the 
middle of an unnecessary conflict.  Tonelson 
also pointed to Kosovo as an example:  the 
U.S. was influenced to become involved 
simply to strengthen NATO’s credibility even 
though its European member nations were 
contributing far less to the alliance operations 
in comparison to those of the U.S. (Tonelson 
2000).   	From a financial perspective, an earlier 
article written by Jyonni Khana and others 
indicates that alliance members in NATO, and 
in the U.N., are in fact free riding on larger 
nations such as the United States.  The authors 
concluded that there is a wide gap in the 
equity of burden sharing.  Their analysis 
focused heavily on peace keeping 
expenditures between 1976 and 1996.  Joint-
product models and collective action theory 
were employed to study the financial 
contributions of the various countries.  The 
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level of fiscal support from the larger 
countries far outweighed those of the smaller 
nations and indicated a great level of free 
riding (Jyonni Khanna et al 1998). 
      More recent studies have tried to take a 
more mixed methods approach; this is 
apparent in Jo Jakobson’s article.  Jakobson 
attempted to draw on the collective action 
approach and the risk-responsibility sharing 
school.  Jakobsen ultimately factored in the 
different variables both schools use, but he 
comes to differing conclusions.  He started the 
study with the standard input measure, (where 
one looks at what countries put into the 
alliance alone) and it became obvious that 
European NATO free rides from this 
analytical perspective.  Furthermore, Jakobsen 
found that non-material free riding can occur 
when a U.S. presence in the country of 
operations is significant as compared to its 
allies.  A further observation demonstrated 
that other allied countries showed a low 
willingness to fight.  He also mentioned that 
the importance of United States military 
spending has to do with other variables.  The 
United States was engaged in various 
operations throughout the world, especially in 
Europe.  The United States’ projection of 
power could essentially outweigh the lessened 
spending of European NATO allies.  
Jakobsen’s conclusion is to remain cautious 
when attempting to decipher whether 
European NATO in fact free rides (Jakobsen 
2018). 
      Examinations of free riding within NATO 
require a more nuanced approach, and Timo 
Kivimaki’s work added new variables to the 
equations associated with economic 
examinations of free riding.  Kivimaki 
produced three new variables to consider in 
the debate, including: a calculation of that 
country’s power, a variable about that 
country’s security guarantees to its allies, and 
the reliance of the U.S. on NATO in out-of-
area efforts. Kivimaki relied heavily on 
Ringsmose’s model for determining levels of 
burden sharing.  He employed these new 
variables to essentially say that European free 
riding appears to be on the decline as 
evidenced by lessened security guarantees.  
Kivimaki indicated that there had been an 
imbalance in the past, but he claimed that the 
gap was beginning to shrink.  Kivimaki’s 
evidence was supported by the inclusion of 
these new and telling variables. (Kivimaki 
2019). 
      Hans Binnendijk explored the problem of 
free riding within NATO from an historical 
standpoint.  Binnendijk reviewed the pros and 
cons of spending within the alliance since its 
inception, and he discussed how the United 
States had attempted to address budgetary 
issues with its allies in the past.  He concluded 
that recent Russian aggression toward Ukraine 
could provide an opening for the United States 
to put more pressure on its European allies.  
The increased pressure could, in turn, coerce 
European allies to commit more to defense 
spending and effectively lessen the burden 
being placed on the U.S.  Binnendijk also 
went through multiple policy proposals that 
would help initiate this pressure, and he also 
delved into how each facet would help to 
equalize burden sharing.  Part of Binnendijk’s 
broader argument is that European NATO is 
changing because new geo-political 
considerations have become more important 
since the fall of the Soviet Union (Binnendijk 
2016). 	BURDEN	SHARING	FROM	AN	ECONOMIC	PERSPECTIVE	
One of the most prominent ways to 
approach burden sharing is from the 
perspective of spending.  The way that NATO 
manages its forces is through each country’s 
defense spending.  The alliance was founded 
on the notion of collective defense.  This is the 
idea that an attack on one ally is considered a 
direct attack on all the other allies (as outlined 
in Article 5 of the treaty).  Collective defense 
stipulates that each member state must 
contribute a significant number of resources to 
POLITICAL	ANALYSIS	·	VOLUME	XXI	·	#$#$	
	 5	
their military, and thus these contributions 
would ensure that all members of the alliance 
would be capable to come to the defense of 
their allies. 
NATO was a much smaller organization 
during the Cold War than it is today, but it 
grew overtime.  The alliance was founded in 
1949, and it was originally comprised of 12 
countries.  It grew to include 16 countries 
between 1949 and 1989, and by 2019 it had 29 
formal allies.  As early as 1950, the U.S. 
attempted to coax Europe into providing more 
for its own defense.  One specific attempt was 
when the U.S. tried to take advantage of the 
onset of the Korean war: “President Truman… 
committed four US army divisions to Europe. 
In return, France promised to take the 
initiative in the creation of a European 
Defence Community,” (Ringsmose 2010).  
Truman’s goal was to initiate a “quid-pro-
quo” where the U.S. would provide some level 
of defense for Europe while he expected it to 
develop its own militaries in return.  
Essentially, Truman’s goal defined the 
essence of burden sharing diplomacy for the 
U.S. throughout the Cold War.  Despite the 
president’s efforts, Congress was adamant in 
reevaluating defense spending within NATO 
(Ringsmose 2010).  This push and pull would 
continue for years to come, but it was apparent 
that the U.S. was contributing far more to 
defense spending than its European 
counterparts.  This demonstrates some level of 
free riding (see Figure 1) (Ringsmose 2010).  
Collective defense, at this point, included 
different factors that modern burden sharing 
no longer focuses on as much.  Nuclear 
deterrence was more important with the Soviet 
Bear lurking, and preparedness for a 
conventional or nuclear attack was given more 
emphasis.  The reinvention of NATO as an 
“out-of-area” force in modern burden sharing 
has changed the way that spending is viewed.  
Now, the U.S. no longer needs to focus on its 
nuclear umbrella as the most important facet 
of collective defense.  Instead, spending can 
be dedicated to more conventional forces in 
order to deal with rogue nations and limiting 
(on a smaller scale) the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons (Hartley 2001).  These 
changes, therefore, open the door for Europe 
to contribute more to NATO by increasing its 
technological and strategic capabilities. 
  The United States has been, and still is, 
the largest spending member of NATO. 
America contributed 51.1% of the alliance’s 
combined GDP and 71.1% of its combined 
defense expenditure in 2017 (Macias 2018).  
Furthermore, the United States dedicated more 
of its GDP (at 3.31%) than any other country. 
23 of the other 28 members failed to meet the 
proposed goal of “2% of GDP being dedicated 
to defense spending” as was agreed upon at 
the Wales Summit in 2014 (NATO.int).  In 
fact, most countries do not seem to be on track 
to even reach the goal of 2% by 2020.  
However, there has been a slight overall 
increase in spending, and estimates for 
defense expenditure as a share of GDP 
indicate that European NATO members are 
contributing more to their defense budgets 
than they have in the past. 
In addition to the overall view of GDP, it 
is also important to consider to which projects 
the money is being applied; a more concrete 
understanding of specific expenditures gives a 
better view of the overall effectiveness of a 
country’s forces.  NATO also has a minimum 
threshold of 20% of GDP expenditure toward 
equipment when considering the greater 
context of a country’s GDP being applied to 
defense (Antonoaie 2018).  Only 11 out of 28 
NATO member-states are adhering to this 
threshold as of 2017 (NATO.int).  
Luxembourg dedicates the greatest portion of 
it’s GDP for military expenditure, to 
equipment.  Overall, only 0.5 percent of its 
GDP is contributed to military expenditures. 
This means that the potency of Luxembourg’s 
forces is still minimal at best.  The power of 
each force is significantly reduced in 
technological advantage because most 
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countries are not upholding their spending 
promises for equipment.   The category of 
equipment also includes R&D expenditures 
for major projects and munitions.  The lack of 
spending in this category further proves that 
not enough countries are investing in the 
technology to modernize their military.  The 
lack of funding is an incredible risk because 
the conduct of warfare is constantly evolving 
(Dubik 1).  The U.S. dedicated 25.73% of its 
total defense expenditure on equipment (part 
of the percentage includes upkeep) in 2017 
which means that far more work is also being 
applied to critical military R&D.  These 
expenditures force the U.S. to maintain its 
technological superiority, but other countries 
are lagging and leaving more of the burden to 
the United States. 
Defense spending has always been a major 
point of contention for the United States and 
its other allies.  Presidential administrations 
have constantly critiqued the lack of spending 
within NATO, especially the lack of spending 
by European allies.  The Bush and Obama 
administrations both found spending levels to 
be too low.  Obama specifically stated, “Free 
riders aggravate me” (Goldberg 2016).  Of 
course, their frustrations went far beyond 
simple rhetoric.  The issue of defense 
spending has taken a new level of importance 
under the Trump Administration.  Trump has 
demonstrated far more grief toward the 
alliance and has stirred up trouble in the 
process.  Within this context, it is imperative 
to understand whether free riding is occurring 
from a fiscal perspective. 
At first glance, it would appear obvious 
that the United States is indeed carrying the 
alliance in terms of expenditures on defense.  
This has been the case since NATO’s 
inception, and has been explored in depth 
through collective action theory.  Mancur 
Olson and Richard Zeckhauser’s piece 
confirms that smaller nations free ride, and 
they rely on the largest nation to provide most 
of the public goods available to those within 
the alliance.  The theory behind collective 
action seems to illustrate how straightforward 
it can be for countries to free ride: “Since the 
benefits of any action an individual takes to 
provide a public or organizational good also 
go to others, individuals acting independently 
do not have an incentive to provide optimal 
quantities of such goods,” (Olson 1966).  The 
economic models show how nations will 
adhere to this method of thinking: the country 
that is the largest (and seeks to increase 
defensive capabilities) will continue to 
increase its own expenditures while smaller 
nations leave the spending to said nation. 
When applying this theory, it makes sense 
that a rather sizable chunk of European 
military expenditure shrank dramatically 
leading up to the end of the Cold War in 1991.  
American military investment between 1981 
and 1990 remained at relatively the same 
level.  On the other hand, European NATO 
members induced a drop of 10.3 percentage 
points.  Furthermore, U.S. military personnel 
numbers were reduced by 7.4 percent, but 
Western Europe’s fell at a higher rate of 10.2 
percent.  By the year 1989, 36 percent of 
NATO’s defense forces were being provided 
by the U.S.  In addition, the U.S. also 
accounted for 64.7 percent of total NATO 
defense expenditures (Tonelson 2000).  The 
United States prioritized its spending on 
defense expansion since it was still in 
competition with the power of the slowly 
declining Soviet Union.  Hence, European 
NATO members were decreasing defense 
spending while taking advantage of the United 
States’ continued focus on contending with 
weakened Soviet military programs. 
The models produced by Olson and 
Zeckhauser have been expanded by other 
scholars since their creation, and updated 
implications must be considered in order to 
paint a more comprehensive picture.  Burden 
Sharing can also be analyzed by using what is 
known as the joint-product model of alliances.  
The joint-product model digresses from the 
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view that alliance contributions to defense are 
pure public goods from which all members of 
the alliance can benefit.  An article written by 
Jacques von Ypersele de Strihau points out the 
fact that a country’s defense expenditures also 
provide benefits that solely increase the 
national goods (as opposed to alliance goods) 
and are instead excludable benefits.  Also, he 
notes that these are joint products of national 
defense expenditures (de Strihau 1967).  He 
goes on to argue that “The value given to each 
country to these strictly national benefits 
should be deducted from the defense 
expenditures to obtain the ‘burden’ borne by 
each country for the provision of the 
international public good,” (de Strihau 1967).  
These strictly national benefits include a range 
of potential categories, including economic 
and political advantages.  This difference in 
views changes the outlook on burden sharing 
from an economic perspective.  As noted by 
Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, the 
implications of a joint-product model could 
potentially even the playing field between 
NATO members and reduce the relevance of 
the exploitation hypothesis put forth by Olson 
and Zeckhauser.  This implies that the larger 
country may be profiting from a high level of 
excludable benefits.  This point of view could 
indeed have merit when looking back at 
Tonelson’s view of defense spending between 
1981 and 1990.  The United States, at the 
time, was still providing a great deal of 
funding to defense while European allies were 
reducing their spending.  One can assume that 
the joint-product model perspective would 
show that the United States was providing a 
large proportion of excludable benefits for 
itself.  Whereas increased deterrence would 
have been a pure public good from which 
European NATO members benefitted, the 
revelation of the joint-product model resulted 
in the inclusion of the political and economic 
factors associated with it.  Increased defense 
spending in the U.S. had strong political 
backing, and it would have provided the 
excludable benefit of greater political support 
for the national government’s administration.  
Furthermore, defense spending would 
contribute to the work force and economic 
strength of a country as more money funneled 
into that industry.  In comparison, European 
NATO countries could have had a more equal 
ratio of burden sharing since they were not 
privy to the excludable benefits inherent 
within U.S. spending. 
       It follows, therefore, that it is important to 
take into consideration the additional variables 
of the joint-product model if one is to better 
understand burden sharing.  This ensures that 
the correct variables are accounted for and 
plugged into calculations accordingly.  The 
joint-product model is where ideas of material 
and non-material burden sharing can begin to 
play a rather pivotal role in understanding how 
NATO members ultimately benefit and 
provide for the alliance.  These views of 
material and non-material burdens became 
more prominent after the end of the Cold War.  
This was due to a shift in mission directives 
spurred by the onset of the “New World 
Order.” The new order had the U.S. at its 
helm, and it formed as a result of the end of 
the bipolar system of the Cold War.  Now, the 
focus was not so much on deterrence against 
Russia as it was on security operations and a 
broader notion of conflict prevention across 
the globe.  New burdens would be introduced 
into the equation as security operations would 
be moved “out-of-area.” 
One such example is military casualties as 
explored by Jo Jakobsen.  Jakobsen points out 
how the use of boots on the ground, a method 
of contributing to security operations, leads to 
the obvious risk of casualties.  But he also 
notes  how these casualties now contribute to 
the variable of political support on the national 
level (Jakobsen 2018).  From a joint-product 
model perspective, the values of those 
excludable goods are subject to change as 
forces are actively being deployed and put in 
harm’s way.  Jakobsen also points out how 
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rules of engagement for each specific ally can 
affect the general effectiveness of their forces 
and, therefore, lessen or enhance their share of 
the burden.  More stringent rules of 
engagement can, of course, lead to less 
casualties enhancing the excludable goods 
from which the nation benefits (or, in other 
words, lessening allied access to the pure 
public goods that country produces) (Jakobsen 
2018).  Hence, this complicates the entire 
equation of burden sharing as the variables 
and their values are subject to more scrutiny 
than they once were.  This leads into an 
analysis of the case studies of Libya and 
Afghanistan and how burden sharing can be 
looked at in greater depth. 	BURDEN	SHARING	FROM	THE	PERSPECTIVE	OF	THE	ISAF	IN	AFGHANISTAN	
The war in Afghanistan proved to be long 
and costly for all the countries it has involved.  
The war has cost the U.S. approximately $975 
billion since 2001 from a fiscal perspective 
alone.  This makes it only second to military 
costs during World War II (which have been 
adjusted for inflation) which were $4.1 trillion 
(McCarthy 2019).  Furthermore, the U.S. has 
suffered over 2,000 casualties and more than 
20,000 wounded in Afghanistan’s Operation 
Enduring Freedom between 2001 and 2014 
(US DOD 2019).  In comparison to Afghan 
coalition allies, the general cost in blood and 
treasure does not seem to align.  In terms of 
fiscal costs, the U.K. precedes the U.S. at only 
£37 billion (approximately $47 billion).  The 
difference in troop casualties is also 
significant, with the UK incurring 455 deaths, 
Canada 158, Germany 54, and France 86 all 
from 2001 to the present (Soldiers Killed in 
Action in Afghanistan 2001-2019).  It would 
appear as though the burden is primarily being 
shifted on the U.S. in terms of concrete 
allocations and losses regarding costs and 
casualties.   
These numbers, taken at face value alone, 
are not enough to understand the complete 
picture of burden sharing in Afghanistan.  A 
study written by Peter Marton and Nik Hynek 
demonstrates an interesting graph which views 
troop deployments and costs in lieu of that 
country’s GDP and population size.  With 
reference to figure 2 in the appendix, one will 
note the contributions of countries such as 
Denmark and Estonia (Hynek 2012).  Both 
countries appear to have provided an 
incredibly small number of troops in 
comparison to countries such as the U.S. and 
the U.K.  However, if one refers to the column 
“People per one soldier deployed in ISAF,” 
the rank of these countries is far higher than 
before.  Denmark is shown to come in at 3rd 
and Estonia in 4th, and they are preceded only 
by the U.S. and the U.K.  Furthermore, the 
financial burden of countries such as Estonia, 
Poland, and Romania accounts for more of 
their “share of GDP” in their “cost per troop” 
than even the US (who is in 4th place).  From 
this perspective, it would appear as though the 
countries are, in fact, pulling more of their 
weight.  The importance of looking at factors 
like these is that it places a country’s 
contributions into the greater context of their 
economic and deployable capabilities.  Surely, 
a smaller country such as Estonia could never 
contribute as much money or troops as the 
U.S., but it could provide a similar if not 
greater ratio of “troops to population” or 
“troops to cost” than some of the larger 
nations in the coalition.  The last interesting 
fact to gather from figure two of the appendix 
is that the country that takes up the greatest 
percentage share of ISAF forces is Canada.  
One should note that the countries which are 
racking up decent numbers represent only a 
handful out of 29. 
These elements are incredibly interesting 
since Operation Enduring Freedom was 
started as part of the United States War on 
Terror.  Since this war was started by the U.S., 
it has become more important to determine 
whether these countries were free riding in 
Afghanistan.  However, the significance of 
troop levels, troop casualties, and fiscal 
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contributions alone is not enough to provide a 
full representation of the burden sharing 
taking place in Afghanistan.  Other important 
factors to note are not so easily quantified.  
One such variable is the potential intra-
political cost of a country’s contributions to 
operations and budget, not wholly dedicated to 
military expenditures, (e.g. financial 
reconstruction, aid and budgetary funds for the 
Afghan government) (Jakobsen 2018).  In 
2009, for example, Obama’s policy of surging 
troops into Afghanistan was initiated.  
According to a Pew Research Center table, 
most people (from the surveyed countries) 
opposed the increase of troops in Afghanistan 
(refer to figure 3 of appendix) (Auxier 2015).  
Despite this opposition, there was a general 
increase in troops between 2009 and 2011 
from those very same NATO countries 
involved in the survey (Rogers 2009).  This 
demonstrates a willingness on the part of these 
countries to sacrifice political clout with their 
constituents in order to contribute to alliance 
operations.  In fact, most of the NATO 
countries involved increased their troop levels 
leaving only Norway, the Netherlands, Latvia, 
Iceland, and Belgium to remove some or all 
their forces from Afghanistan.  Canada also 
reinforced its claims to leave Afghanistan 
(Siegel 2009). 
The extent of aid provided in order to help 
rebuild Afghanistan is the other significant 
measure that is mentioned.  Reference to 
figure 4 demonstrates various countries that 
have provided aid to Afghanistan between 
2002 and 2008.  Among the NATO countries 
on this table, the U.S. has clearly donated the 
most, with the U.K. and Germany being the 
next highest NATO donors consecutively.  
One would be remiss to not mention that the 
final aid total disbursed by the U.S. is in fact 
$5,022.7 million.  The U.S. donation amount 
is still significantly higher than that of its 
other allies: the U.K.’s final disbursement is 
closer to $1266.3 million, and Germany’s is 
closer to $767.84 million.  Aid promised 
(while demonstrating what could be a desire to 
take on a fair share of the burden) is irrelevant 
since the actual burden sharing aspect comes 
down to what was spent.  (Fayez 2012). 
When looking at Afghanistan as a whole, 
it would still seem as though the U.S. is taking 
on a much larger share of the burden 
compared to its allies.  In terms of dedicating 
military funding it tops the charts even despite 
some of its smaller allies’ attempts to pull 
their weight in terms of force deployments.  
Context does show that some of the smaller 
countries are providing a great deal in lieu of 
their reduced capabilities, but some of the 
more powerful countries are not making up for 
deficiencies where they could.  This lack of 
support is especially highlighted when looking 
at the deployment of their forces: “The 
European contribution to the actual combat 
theater was minimal and primarily included 
British forces in the form of air assistance. 
Because the initial stages of the campaign 
involved almost exclusively the use of Special 
Forces and air power, technological and other 
capacity issues limited the role European 
forces could play” (Siegel 2009).  This is 
further proved by the thought process of 
NATO when considering whether to deploy a 
peacekeeping force outside of Kabul in 2002.  
NATO considered Great Britain to be the only 
other country capable of quickly deploying an 
effective force in the region (Jones 2009).  
Moreover, the U.S. appeared to be taking the 
lead regarding reconstruction efforts; 14 out of 
19 provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) 
were manned by the U.S. leaving only 5 of 
them to be led by ISAF and NATO countries 
in 2005 (Rashid 2008).  In addition, the 
effectiveness of NATO forces and their 
contributions were not up to par despite their 
efforts to contribute: “In 2006, NATO 
promised to place a PRT in all of 
Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces.  
However, the Establishment of “national 
caveats” stipulating what its PRT force could 
and could not do was to paralyze NATO’s 
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effectiveness in combating the Taliban,” 
(Rashid 2008).   
Furthermore, these countries’ disregard for 
public opinion and their willingness to 
sacrifice their political power back home 
would seem to indicate a discrepancy in the 
ideas put forth through collective action.  Such 
actions are in direct opposition to the basic 
premise of the exploitation hypothesis since 
those countries were still willing to put their 
forces in harm’s way for an operation that is 
more important for the U.S. than most of the 
other NATO allies.  In contrast, one could 
argue that U.S. leaders were also putting their 
political clout back home at risk with their 
massive deployments of troops.  While 
Canada made up the larger share of NATO 
forces earlier in the war, the U.S. currently 
makes up 12,000 of the remaining 17,148 
NATO troops deployed (War in Afghanistan 
Global Conflict Tracker).  When Obama had 
asked in April 2009 for European NATO 
members to contribute more forces along with 
his surge of troops, Canada (as well as the 
Netherlands) reconfirmed a prior commitment 
to pull troops out of the country as a direct act 
of defiance against the surge (Siegel 2009).  
This is an indication that allies were beginning 
to contribute less resources as time went on, 
and this would seem to suggest that the cost of 
providing forces was no longer worth the 
benefit of appeasing the U.S. and “keeping the 
Americans in” (Matlary 2014) the alliance.  
While this does not account for the spending 
in aid, the great reduction in allied forces 
removes the costs of gambling political clout 
and being influenced by domestic constraints, 
which is one of the greater, if not the greatest, 
factors in burden sharing today (Matlary 
2014).  This is also backed up by Ringsmose 
who states that “As NATO became involved 
in out-of-area operations… the burden-sharing 
debates increasingly came to focus not only on 
deployable military assets, but also on the fair 
sharing of risks,” (Ringsmose 2010).  Instead, 
“checkbook diplomacy,” which reduces the 
argument to simply how much money one 
provided, began to be frowned upon by the 
international community.  The importance of 
domestic constraints is essential, and the U.S. 
was bearing a heavier share of the burden in 
this regard.  Consider that “Fifty-seven 
percent of Americans, including 69 percent of 
military veterans, said they would support a 
decision by the president to remove all troops 
from Afghanistan,” (“Public Opinion on 
Afghanistan War: 2018 Poll”). 	BURDEN	SHARING	FROM	THE	PERSPECTIVE	OF	LIBYA	
At first glance, the onset of the 2011 
conflict in Libya had potential to provide a 
new template of how burden sharing could 
work between America and its NATO allies.  
Libya is within the general proximity of 
Europe, but the United States itself did not 
have any major stake in the conflict at all.  
U.S. interests are relevant to burden sharing 
because they bring into question how willing 
America is to commit its resources to a 
conflict that is not directly related to its 
national security.  In the beginning, President 
Obama was hesitant over what role to play in 
the ongoing developments in Libya.  Obama 
took a more cautious approach until the 
situation deteriorated into further chaos.  
Eventually, Operation Odyssey Dawn was put 
into motion and the U.S. was going to work 
alongside its allies while utilizing its strategic 
command in a targeted air campaign.  Obama 
wanted the U.S. to engage in a primarily 
assistive role while NATO allies would 
engage in the bulk of hard operations which 
was contrary to how operations had been run 
in the past.  The administration was adamant 
that absolutely no U.S. troops were going to 
be deployed to the region, and Obama 
outlined a plan for U.S. involvement.  The 
plan radically altered how the military 
typically allocated its resources to such 
operations.  Instead of having the U.S. invest 
the largest share of military assets to the 
operation (as it had done for virtually all other 
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operations), Obama wanted to take a more 
restrained approach.  He wanted the U.S. to 
move in with purpose and strength in order to 
break through Libyan defenses; then, US 
forces would pull back while only providing 
capabilities that the other NATO allies lacked 
from a military standpoint (Chiviss 2014).  
This military plan indicated a completely 
different level of practical burden sharing.  
Rather than the U.S. supplying more of its 
forces in harm’s way, it was instead using its 
unique military role to direct allied forces and 
provide cohesion for NATO in the areas 
where it was lacking.  From the perspective of 
a reduced U.S. role, it would appear as though 
a large share of the burden was suddenly 
shifted away from the U.S. and onto others in 
the alliance.  One of the main reasons Obama 
took this position was to reduce the strain on 
taxpayers and the military back home 
(Hallams 2012).  Obama’s desire to satisfy his 
constituency plays into the excludable benefit 
of political clout.  Since the administration 
had effectively increased its excludable 
benefit, there must be a reduction of pure 
public goods since the U.S. would no longer 
contribute as much.  This implies that other 
NATO allies were putting much more on the 
line, and the value of the pure public goods 
they provided increased.  With their forces 
being put out on the “front lines,” it was the 
lives of their soldiers, the wear of their 
equipment, and the spending of their money 
that was being allocated to more of the 
operation than had been the case in the past 
(Hallams 2012).   
When one takes a concrete look at the 
numbers involved in Libya, a different story 
can be gleaned.  The first major piece of data 
to note is the number of sorties that were 
flown by NATO forces.  Even though the U.S. 
meant to engage in a far more constrained role 
throughout the entire operation, it still 
managed to fly the most sorties with a total of 
2,000.  The UK and France were not far 
behind flying 1,300 and 1,200 sorties 
respectively.  While most sorties were flown 
by non-U.S. NATO forces (75% to be exact), 
this did not account for the lack of effective 
force employed by them (Shanker 2011).  The 
U.S. still boasted the largest concentration of 
forces in the region, and it surpassed all allies 
in the categories of personnel, aircraft, ships, 
and the deployment of cruise missiles.  Unlike 
the sorties, the United States greatly surpassed 
its counterparts: the combined forces of the 
U.K. and France were still not enough to 
match the concentration of U.S. assets in any 
of the categories (Rogers 2011).  Tim 
Hasebrouck points out that despite the U.S. 
plan to pull back after the operation was in 
motion, the U.S. still seemed to demonstrate 
that it was “a prisoner of its size” since it 
continued to provide essential military 
assistance to the bulk of operations 
(Hasebrouck 2016).  The fact that the U.S., 
even in its reduced role, was forced to step up 
to such a degree demonstrates two things: 
1. In order for the alliance to function 
properly, the U.S. must be involved in 
a leading capacity at some level, 
otherwise operations would become 
far more costly to all allies. 
2. NATO allies were severely lacking in 
multiple facets of military readiness 
and combat effectiveness as indicated 
by the holes left for the U.S. to fill. 
These implications are essential to 
understanding the burden sharing dynamics of 
NATO.  Both implications would appear to 
give credence to the theory of collective action 
and its exploitation hypothesis.  Since the U.S. 
possessed such an overwhelming force and 
well-funded military, most other allies were 
counting on the U.S. and its position of power 
to make up for their deficiencies.  Therefore, 
the other countries in NATO chose not to 
spend as much on their militaries since they 
knew that the U.S. would end up 
strengthening the overall capability of the 
alliance.  This is what led to NATO allies 
dedicating less of their GDP to critical 
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military equipment and personnel which 
would have helped to strengthen the alliance.     
NATO’s lack of military effectiveness was 
made apparent by several deficiencies.  
According to an article written by Thom 
Shanker and Eric Schmitt, the U.S. (and to a 
lesser degree some of its more powerful allies) 
had to “lead from behind.”  Regarding the 
sorties that were flown, “NATO does not have 
a roster of experienced officers to do its own 
targeting- the essence of successful air 
warfare.  Only the United States, Britain, and 
France have targeteers up to modern 
standards,” (Shanker 2011).  The article also 
goes on to point out that the U.S. decision to 
let other allies lead revealed major 
shortcomings regarding intelligence 
gathering/reconnaissance equipment as well as 
certain critical munitions (Shanker 2011).  As 
stated by Ivo Daalder and James Stavridis, 
“The heavy reliance of alliance members on 
the United States during the conflict 
highlighted the cost of a decade of European 
underinvestment in defense,” (Daalder 2012).  
In the case of Libya, it would appear as 
though the free riding of NATO allies forced 
the US to engage in a heavily involved combat 
role despite Obama’s initial reluctance. 
It is also important to consider the 
countries that did not take an active role in 
Libya.  A number of these countries were 
simply unable to participate due to limits on 
their forces and budgets.  But when a country 
like Germany decided to opt out of the 
operations, there were greater implications at 
large.  Germany had the capability to provide 
military assistance, but only participated in a 
limited surveillance role and abstained from 
the UN security council vote to authorize the 
intervention.  According to a website 
dedicated to measuring military capabilities, 
Germany is currently the 5th most powerful 
member state of NATO (NATO Member 
States Ranked by Military Strength).  Poland, 
while ranked 9th in terms of capability (NATO 
Member States Ranked by Military Strength), 
refrained from direct participation in the 
operation and only supplied precision missiles 
to its NATO allies (Daalder 2012).  The lack 
of unity within NATO would seem to 
demonstrate an inability to act in a collective 
manner.  While some allies bear the brunt of 
combat, others will simply engage in a 
“supportive” role without truly placing any of 
their forces in harm’s way.  This is 
problematic as the involvement of some of 
these countries could have helped to relieve 
the burden that was placed on the U.S.  While 
there likely still would have been major holes 
for the U.S. to fill in terms of offensive 
capabilities, these nation’s lack of support and 
participation is yet another sign that free 
riding was apparent in the Libyan 
intervention.  Unlike the more dedicated 
efforts of allies such as the U.K. and France, 
these absentee countries played to the tune of 
the exploitation hypothesis by letting other 
countries deal with the risks associated with 
direct involvement.   
It is also important to note that the 
countries that did try to contribute more to 
Libya, likely only did so in order to try and 
appease the U.S. by trying to take a more 
active role in the alliance. According to Jane 
Matlary, “the present challenge to NATO 
states in Europe is… to contribute and show 
solidarity with the United States, [and] also to 
take responsibility for security and defense 
policy in lead roles, as in Libya… this 
challenge comes at a time of deep budget cuts 
and where risk willingness is part of burden 
sharing. Military contributions must be… 
ready for combat,” (Matlary 2014).  This 
demonstrates how European countries might 
be unwilling to provide more to NATO at a 
time when their nations are in “deep peace 
mode” and not as conducive toward sending 
their people into harm’s way.  The fact that 
countries such as the U.K. and France might 
have only contributed to the alliance to 
appease the U.S. while other countries are 
focusing on their own domestic political 
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factors, further demonstrates the splintering of 
NATO cohesiveness.  This, in turn, is another 
factor that leads to the U.S. being forced to 
make up for the lack of participation and 
readiness of those unwilling countries. 		CONCLUSION		
The literature on burden sharing has 
shown great development over the years 
moving from a more pecuniary focus, to a 
focus that incorporates a variety of 
inconspicuous factors.  From a deterrence and 
pure public goods standpoint, the United 
States is bearing an unfair share of the burden.  
The simple fact that it is leading the way 
economically (and in turn with the efficiency 
and effectiveness of its forces) shows that 
non-U.S. NATO allies are indeed benefitting 
unfairly from its ally’s efforts.  The decline in 
NATO allied defense spending indicates the 
acceptance of relying on U.S. capabilities and 
letting their own forces bear less of the 
financial responsibility associated with 
collective defense. 
However, the simplicity of this model does 
not consider other factors that can be just as 
important to burden sharing.  The joint-
product model would seem to take better 
account of factors that do not seem 
immediately pertinent to burden sharing but 
are without a doubt just as important.  The 
dedication of alliance forces can produce 
strain in a political manner due to the potential 
loss of life and the ramifications such losses 
can have back home.  Furthermore, the 
introduction of excludable goods levels the 
playing field in different ways.  The massive 
output of defense provided by the U.S., incurs 
significant benefits that are only a positive for 
the U.S. alone.  The expansion of the defense 
industry, for example, can provide jobs and 
further stimulate the U.S. economy; however, 
this is a good that other nations cannot benefit 
from directly.  This same idea can be 
redirected back to non-U.S. NATO allies.  
Many of them intend to focus more on 
domestic issues at home while letting their 
forces weaken under the greater protection of 
the United States.  With new threats on the 
rise and a turn to out-of-area operations, it 
becomes apparent that if the U.S. “is able to 
provide politically or physically sufficient 
levels of security for the rest of NATO’s 
members in response… then other members 
can free ride and will provide little additional 
assistance. Therefore, we should expect even 
more free riding than in the past,” (Siegel 
2009). 
Regarding Libya and Afghanistan, it 
would appear as though NATO allies were 
contributing to a more balanced and fair 
system of burden sharing, but this is in fact 
not the case.  In Afghanistan, alliance 
cooperation and burden sharing were on more 
equal footing with the initial invocation of 
Article 5.  Countries were attempting to 
provide military assistance to the operations 
despite the limitations their economies and 
populations imposed upon them.  However, 
there were only a few countries that provided 
enough force in any truly effective sense.  
While major allies such as Canada did indeed 
provide a great deal for the alliance in the 
beginning, support tapered off overtime.  
Several other capable countries did not 
dedicate as much as they could have, and even 
when they did, their support provided little 
strategic significance.  Instead, U.S. forces 
were providing for the bulk of the operation 
while its allies were hampered by inefficient 
forces and a reluctance to give in to U.S. 
unilateralism.  In addition, the restraints 
placed on rules of engagement and other 
factors significantly reduced the effectiveness 
of their combat roles.  This forced the U.S. to 
pick up the slack, as it had done during the 
Cold War, with its deterrence abilities.  The 
eventual decline in alliance involvement also 
indicates support for collective action theory 
as allies began to outweigh the costs to the 
benefits of participating in combat operations 
with the U.S.   
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In Libya, on the other hand, the U.S. 
attempted to reduce its role in combat 
operations while NATO allies shouldered the 
burden of putting their forces in potential 
danger.  While the U.S. was dedicating its 
budget to strategic command, its allies were 
making up for their lack of defense spending 
by taking more responsibility through both 
material and non-material variables.  The 
involvement of more subtle factors completely 
changes the implications of collective action.  
However, the statistics indicated that the U.S. 
was still forced to engage in taking on a larger 
share of the burden than it had anticipated or 
even wanted.  The other allies did in fact 
break through domestic constraints by putting 
their forces in harm’s way.  But Hasebrouck’s 
work showed that such constraints were not as 
prominent because Libya was considered an 
easier operation, and the U.S. still took on a 
greater role.  Furthermore, the implications of 
increased U.S. involvement show in a 
concrete way that free riding is occurring.  
The inability of European forces to deal with 
the realities of modern combat forced them to 
rely on the U.S. even though they were trying 
to take more of a leadership role in the 
operation.   
It could be argued that had more of the 
countries involved been contributing more of 
their GDP to their forces in the first place 
(especially to training pilots and updating their 
technology), the U.S. would not have had to 
employ its unique combat abilities as much as 
it did.  The two case studies show that free 
riding occurs because NATO forces have not 
modernized their forces well.  Through the 
theoretical application of collective action and 
the joint-product model to case studies, burden 
sharing is still not on the equal footing that the 
U.S. would like.  While there are many factors 
involved in determining levels of free riding in 
NATO, a large gap still needs to be closed 
between the U.S. and its allies (especially 
regarding military effectiveness).  Although 
×non-U.S. NATO allies are increasing their 
spending, the effectiveness of their forces 
proves that the U.S. is forced, due to its size, 
to attend to unfulfilled facets of combat 
preparedness.  This, then, puts the obligation 
of maintaining a modern military force on the 
U.S. Therefore, it is forced to spend more 
money while letting other nations free ride.  In 
the end, NATO is still engaged in a mindset of 
relying on the U.S. to take on the more costly 
aspects of alliance burden sharing. 		APPENDIX		
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